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Abstract This article argues that the forces which shape how the EU engages with
international financial governance are changing and that the implications for the
EU’s ability to impose its preferences internationally are significant. It suggests that
this change is being driven by two related factors. First, the European Supervisory
Authorities (ESAs), with their distinct incentives, preferences and powers, have
recently come to prominence in international financial governance. Second, as
international financial governance pivots from being preoccupied with standard
setting to becoming concerned with operational matters, there is greater potential for
influence to be exerted by administrative actors such as the ESAs. This article uses
the European Securities and Markets Authority—which is the most active ESA
internationally—as a case study for examining the implications of the availability of
a technocratic administrative channel through which the EU can engage with
international financial governance. It also offers some predictions as to the impli-
cations of the Brexit decision for the ESAs as international actors and for the UK’s
interaction with international financial governance.
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1 Brexit, the EU, and International Financial Governance
The ‘Brexit’ decision of 23 June 2016 has generated intense discussion and
speculation on the nature of the UK’s future relationship with the EU.1 At the time
of writing there are few indications as to the likely shape of the arrangements which
will govern the relationship between the UK and the EU-27—whether customs
union, free trade area, European Economic Area (EEA), or other variant. It can be
predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty that the process of extracting the UK
from EU financial governance—within which the UK financial system is deeply
embedded—will be complex and lengthy. It can also be predicted reasonably safely
that the nature of the UK’s influence on international financial governance will
change on exit from the EU. This will be in no small part because the UK will no
longer be represented on the EU’s European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), which
are becoming increasingly influential on international financial governance. The
primary purpose of this article is to consider why and how the means through which
the EU engages with international financial governance are changing, and the
implications of this. Given that, almost contemporaneously with the ESAs
becoming more active in international financial governance, the UK will be
withdrawing from the ESAs, the article also offers some predictions as to how
Brexit is likely to shape UK and EU interaction with international financial
governance.
International financial governance is usually characterised as the system which
imposes standards on the global financial market, supports market access, and
facilitates supervisory and regulatory coordination, primarily by means of the
different measures adopted by the international standard-setting bodies (ISSBs); the
ISSBs are typically composed of national regulatory authorities and/or central banks
and ministries of finance, depending on the ISSB’s particular mandate.2 The main
ISSBs are the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (Basel Committee), the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
Foundation, and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).
These ISSBs have, by implementing high-level political directions from the G20,
come to play a determinative role in re-shaping domestic, regional, and international
financial governance in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.3 In the EU, the G20
reform agenda provided the template which the EU used to re-cast regulatory
governance.4 The Basel III Accord reforms to the regulation of bank capital,
liquidity, and leverage, and the IFRS 9 reforms to how banks report on impaired
assets, to take only two from a multitude of examples of ISSB standards, are
bringing fundamental change to how banks in the EU lend, manage risks to their
balance sheets, and report to the financial markets. To take a current example, the
1 See, e.g., the collection of essays in the July 2016 special edition of the German Law Journal (17
Germany Law Journal 2016), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/brexit-supplement.
2 See Avgouleas (2012) and Davies and Green (2008).
3 For a recent review, see Quaglia (2014a).
4 Ferran (2012a) and Moloney (2010).
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EU is currently assessing how to address the important new ‘TLAC’ (total loss
absorbing capacity) standards for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs),
which are a key element of the post-crisis global framework for addressing orderly
bank resolution and which were adopted by the FSB in November 2015,5 and how
the TLAC standards will relate to the similar ‘MREL’ (minimum own funds and
eligible liabilities) requirements which apply to banks and investment firms in the
EU.
Given that international financial governance shapes EU financial governance,
the extent to which the EU can impose its preferences matters. So does the relative
effectiveness of the channels through which the EU engages with international
financial governance. This article suggests that the nature of the EU’s engagement
with international financial governance is changing and that these changes are likely
to strengthen the EU’s ability to impose its preferences. It identifies two factors
which are re-shaping how the EU engages with international financial governance.
First, the ESAs have opened up a new administrative channel for EU engagement:
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is the most active
internationally, followed by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). Second,
international financial governance is more readily accommodating the preferences
of administrative actors such as the ESAs as it pivots from being mainly
preoccupied with standard setting (in relation to which national political interests
have traditionally been paramount) to adopting a more operational posture (in
relation to which the interests of administrative financial regulators are becoming
increasingly paramount). The article takes ESMA as a case study—as the most
active ESA internationally—and considers whether, as an administrative actor, it is
strengthening the EU’s ability to impose its preferences as international financial
governance becomes more operational in nature. It suggests that ESMA and the
other ESAs have the potential to become significant actors in international financial
governance and to strengthen, as a result, the EU’s ability to impose its preferences.
Additionally, it suggests that the ESAs may enhance the effectiveness of
international financial governance by strengthening its ability, as a system, to
ensure that standards are treated as obligations and that related monitoring and
enforcement systems are in place.6 The article also speculates that the UK’s
influence on international financial governance is likely to diminish, given that it
will no longer be represented on the ESAs.
Section 2 situates the analysis within the literature and contextualises the current
dynamics of international financial governance. Section 3 considers the incentives
and powers of the ESAs with respect to international financial governance, and
Sect. 4 examines ESMA as a case study. Section 5 considers the implications of the
Brexit decision. Section 6 concludes.7
5 FSB (2015a).
6 This conceptualisation of effectiveness draws on Barr (2014).
7 Some elements of the analysis in Sects. 2 and 3 draw on arguments outlined in Moloney (2017).
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2 EU ‘Agencification’ and International Financial Governance:
Literature and Context
2.1 Situating the Analysis
Scholarly inquiry into international financial governance falls primarily within the
fields of international financial law and of international and comparative political
economy,8 although discussions typically identify a scarcity of scholarship.9
Legal scholarship typically adopts an effectiveness-oriented perspective and
considers how international financial governance achieves outcomes, including
through its governing institutions. Its main concern is with explaining how and
why international financial governance, although primarily based on soft standards
and on informal networks of domestic regulators operating through the ISSBs, can
exert coercive force10 and overcome the risks to its durability posed by major
global crises.11 A related body of legal scholarship probes the accountability and
legitimacy risks which derive from the network- and soft-law-based nature of
international financial governance and the mitigating procedural devices which are
evolving.12 The increasingly rich legal literature on the ESAs, however, has yet to
focus closely on their role as administrative actors in international financial
governance.13 But while somewhat sparse, this composite legal literature supports
discussion of the challenges which the ESAs face in engaging with international
financial governance as administrative actors and of how their capacities and
powers can shape EU engagement.
The international political economy and comparative political economy literature
provides tools of analysis for examining the power dynamics of international financial
governance and how different preferences are imposed.14 It therefore sheds light on the
context in which the ESAs operate. This literature has classically characterised
international financial governance as being a function of the preferences of the ‘great
8 The experimentalist governance strand of regulatory theory, which examines the flexible and
responsive governance tools beyond traditional ‘command and control’ legislation that can be used to
achieve outcomes, also considers international financial governance, particularly with respect to the
different tools which the ISSBs deploy. See Campbell-Verduyn and Porter (2014).
9 From a legal perspective, see, e.g., Brummer (2011), and from a political economy perspective, see
Mu¨gge (2014a) and Quaglia (2014b).
10 See, e.g., Brummer (2014), Brummer (2012), Kelly and Cho (2011), and Yadav (2010). Much of this
analysis builds on the network theory of international law: Slaughter (2004).
11 See, e.g., Verdier (2013), Pan (2010), and Zaring (2009).
12 See, e.g., Barr (2014) and Barr and Miller (2006).
13 Relevant scholarship has focused primarily on the EU’s role and approach generally and probes the
lessons which international financial governance might draw from the EU experience. Key contributions
include Ferran (2014) and Amtenbrick (2013).
14 For a review of the literature, see Helleiner and Pagliari (2011). On the political economy of, e.g., EU/
US relations generally with respect to financial services, see Du¨r (2011) and Posner and Ve´ron (2010).
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powers’ infinance—theUS15 andalso, increasingly, theEU.16But theEU’s ability to act as
a ‘great power’ is constrained. The deep-seated institutional structures which shape
different national economies andfinancial systems in theEU (andwhich have been charted
by the Varieties of Capitalism literature17 and recent discussions on the blurring of the
classic market- and bank-based economy structures18) also shape national regulatory
preferences and drive divergence.DistinctMemberState regulatory preferences, the extent
to which such preferences cohere to an EU approach, and the related and varying ability of
the EU to ‘up-load’ its preferences internationally, to ‘down-load’ international standards,
and to ‘cross-load’ its preferences to third countries, have been identified as leading to
differing degrees of EU influence on international finance governance over time.19 The
Basel III Accord negotiations, for example, saw differences between the negotiating
positions of the EU and of its Member States, reflecting structural differences in banking
markets across the EU and related divergences in national preferences.20 The EU presence
as a ‘great power’ in international financial governance is likely to be strong where either
the Member States can coordinate their distinct national preferences or—typically where
the distributional effects are weaker and structural differences across national economies
and financial systems less relevant—there is extensive delegation to representative EU
agents.21 And here the international political economy literature provides an important
insight. It posits that administrative agencies can shape and diffuse preferences by
supporting the ‘regulatory capacity’ of the state—or the state’s ability to achieve desired
outcomes through the adoption, monitoring, and enforcing of rules.22 With the requisite
regulatory capacity, state preferences can be imposed through, for example, third-country
market access/equivalence mechanisms which require third countries to follow the state’s
regulatory approach. The extent of a state’s regulatory capacity also shapes its ability to
transmit, through its domestic regulators, national regulatory preferences to the interna-
tional level.23 The EU’s regulatory capacity generally (legislative and administrative) has
accordingly been identified as of central importance to its degree of influence on
international financial governance, whether exerted through its use of equivalence/access
mechanisms, its direct influence on the negotiation of international standards, or its ability
to ‘harden’ soft standards globally by adopting them for the EU.24 But the political
15 See, e.g., Drezner (2007).
16 Mu¨gge (2014b). The EU financial market is second only to the US market in size. Recent analysis by
the Commission undertaken in the context of the Capital Markets Union agenda notes that, as at end 2013,
EU stock market capitalisation stood at €8.4 trillion (64.5% of GDP), while the value of outstanding debt
securities was €22.3 trillion (171.3% of GDP): European Commission (2015), at pp. 10–11.
17 The foundational work is Hall and Soskice (2001), which, very broadly, distinguishes between bank-
and market-based economies.
18 See, e.g., Hardie and Howarth (2013).
19 On ‘up-loading’, ‘cross-loading’, and ‘down-loading’, see Quaglia (2014a).
20 See Howarth and Quaglia (2015).
21 Mu¨gge (2011).
22 In the political economy literature regulatory capacity is associated with the ability of a state to
formulate, monitor, and enforce rules: Bach and Newman (2007). For a recent examination in the context
of the EU’s global relations generally, see Newman and Posner (2015).
23 See, e.g., Quaglia (2014a) and Bu¨the and Mattli (2011).
24 See, e.g., Bach and Newman (2014), Posner (2009), and Posner (2010).
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economy literature has yet to closely examine theESAs andhow they, by strengthening the
EU’s regulatory capacity by providing a new administrative channel for the formation and
diffusion of EU preferences, may reshape EU engagement.25
This article is primarily situated within a legal analytical framework. It probes
how particular powers, legal tools, and institutional/constitutional constraints and
incentives at the administrative ESA level, and particular at the ESMA level, are re-
shaping how the EU engages with international financial governance. But it draws
on a composite literature to support its examination of how the ESAs’ powers,
preferences, and incentives may lead to change and of how the effectiveness of
international financial governance more generally may be affected.
2.2 The Context: The Changing Nature of International Financial
Governance
Prior to the financial and subsequent euro area crises which beset the EU over
2008–2012, the EU was becoming an influential actor in international financial
governance.26 Over the crisis-era reform period (2008–2014) this influence
increased as the EU became a force in the major ISSBs and sought to export its
approach to financial governance globally as the G20 reform agenda was
implemented.27 The major elements of the massive G20 reform agenda are now
in place.28 The extent to which the EU’s preferences have shaped the related
international standards and/or have led to the filtering and calibration of
international standards during the EU implementation process to reflect EU
interests can now be seen.29 So too can the success or otherwise of the EU in ‘cross-
loading’ its crisis-era rules to third countries through its market access and
equivalence mechanisms.30 However, changes to the nature of international
financial governance are underway and these are likely to strengthen the EU’s
ability to impose its preferences.
International financial governance is currently pivoting from being primarily
preoccupied with the agreement of standards to becoming mainly concerned with
the achievement of outcomes. This pivot has brought with it a focus on the finessing
25 Brief reference to the ESAs’ potential role in international financial governance has been made by
leading international political economists, such as Mu¨gge and Quaglia, but their focus has primarily been
on Member State power relations. See, e.g., Mu¨gge (2014b) and Quaglia (2014a), at pp. 180–181.
26 Examples include the resolution of the ‘Hotel California’ problem which prevented EU (or any) firms
from delisting (exiting) from US exchanges (demand for delisting increased following the adoption of the
2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act and its related imposition of disclosure and corporate governance
requirements) where they had 300 shareholders in the US. Following EU/US negotiations, a delisting
mechanism based on global trading volumes was adopted in 2007.
27 For a consideration of the major developments, see Moloney (2017).
28 As is clear from the regular progress reports from the FSB to the G20: recently, FSB, Chair’s Letter to
G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 19 July 2016.
29 See, e.g., Quaglia (2015) and Blom (2014). The divergences between the EU’s banking regime
(Directive 2013/36/EU, OJ 2013 L176/338, and Regulation EU No 575/2013, OJ 2013 L176/1) and the
Basel III Accord have been charted with some concern by the Basel Committee (2014a).
30 The EU has been particularly successful in ‘cross-loading’ its credit rating agency regulation through
third-country access/equivalence rules. Moloney (2014a), at pp. 677–682.
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of standards, the monitoring of standard implementation and the management of
related divergences, the coordination of supervision and enforcement, and data
collection and assessment. Related operational coordination, and the management of
divergent approaches to and styles of financial governance, have come to define
much of international financial governance engagement, reflecting the character-
isation of post-crisis international financial governance as a form of ‘mutual
adaptation’ and of ‘co-operative de-centralization’.31 The FSB, for example, is
engaging in regular and intensive peer reviews of how crisis-era standards are being
implemented,32 while the Basel Committee is carrying out intensive Regulatory
Consistency Assessment Programmes (RCAPs) of Basel III Accord implementation
by its members internationally and reviewing implementation more generally.33
Similarly, the IAIS has adopted a Coordinated Implementation Framework to
support the implementation of insurance standards. Standards are also being
finessed by the ISSBs as empirical data on their impact emerges.34 Supervisory
coordination arrangements are being hammered out, with the effectiveness of
colleges of supervisors increasingly the concern of the ISSBs.35 The quality of
supervision is receiving close attention under the Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP) assessments now required of all FSB members, which review,
inter alia, the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (2010)
(which cover supervision) and the Basel Core Principles for Banking Supervision
(2012).36 Enforcement—hitherto not a major concern of international financial
governance—is becoming a priority.37 Similarly, IOSCO and the FSB are focusing
closely on the management of conduct risk and on related enforcement—a classic
operational concern of domestic regulators but a new area of interest for the
ISSBs.38 The operational details of market access arrangements are also receiving
close attention, particularly from IOSCO.39 Coordinated efforts are being made
through the ISSBs to understand, manage, and interrogate the vast data set now
emerging from the new crisis-era reporting requirements40 and to monitor global
31 Helleiner and Pagliari (2011).
32 Based on Financial Stability Board (2015b). See Gadinis (2013a).
33 See recently Basel Committee (2016).
34 Such as the July 2015 review by the Basel Committee of the Basel III Credit Valuation Adjustment
(CVA) capital charge. The review reflects experience with the hedging techniques banks have adopted in
response to the CVA charge: Basel Committee (2015).
35 IOSCO, e.g., has adopted principles for rating agency supervisory colleges (IOSCO 2013), and the
Basel Committee, which has a Task Force on Supervisory Colleges, has adopted principles for bank
colleges (Basel Committee 2014b). The FSB recently carried out a thematic review of the operation of
bank colleges (FSB 2015c).
36 Recent examples include the April 2015 FSAP report on the US system (IMF 2015).
37 IOSCO (2015a).
38 IOSCO (2016) and FSB (2015d).
39 IOSCO (2015b).
40 Coordination measures are underway with respect to the management and use of the massive data set
now emerging from the OTC derivatives markets [e.g., FSB (2015e), noting challenges in relation to
regulatory access to and the usability of the data now held by trade repositories (at pp. 21–22)]. Similar
concerns, as well as progress on remediation, was reported in FSB (2015f).
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risks.41 Bilaterally, agency contacts and skirmishes are intensifying as the technical
requirements for market access are coordinated.42 This change in posture is likely to
herald a more prominent role for regulators in international financial governance.
The distributional effects of international financial governance imply that national
political interests will continue to exert a strong influence, particularly on the
ISSBs.43 But these effects are likely to weaken as international financial governance
becomes more operational. Regulatory agencies and their powers, interests, and
preferences can be expected to become increasingly influential. The current
international environment is therefore likely to be accommodating for the recent
‘agencification’ of the mechanisms through which the EU engages with interna-
tional financial governance, namely the ESAs.
3 The ESAs and the ‘Agencification’ of International Engagement:
Powers and Incentives
3.1 The ESAs and International Financial Governance
The 2011 reorganisation of the institutional structure supporting EU financial
governance by means of the establishment of the European System of Financial
Supervision, which includes the ESAs as well as national financial regulators, was
internally focused. It was designed to address EU-specific challenges relating to the
management of pan-EU risk transmission. But with it has come a spill-over change
to the regulatory capacity of the EU with respect to international financial
governance.
The management of the EU’s international financial relations with the ISSBs is,
for the most part, split between the supranational and national elements of EU
governance: the Commission (as the EU’s supranational, executive body) and the
ECB (depending on the issue at hand), on the one hand; and the Member States,
which are usually dominant and typically seek to impose their distinct national
preferences, on the other. The European Parliament is not a representative actor in
international financial governance. It is, however, increasingly seeking to exert
oversight over the EU’s international engagement. It has recently expressed concern
as to the potential for a lack of accountability and transparency in the actors of
international financial governance to subvert the democratic process in the EU.44
The Commission usually represents the collective EU interest (where one can be
41 In relation to which the FSB is playing a prominent role: e.g., FSB (2015g).
42 Particular difficulties persist with conflicts, inconsistencies, and duplication with respect to OTC
derivatives market regulation, despite the November 2014 Brisbane G20 Summit’s call for jurisdictions to
show ‘deference’ to other systems where possible. US and EU discussions have progressed, however,
with the Commission ruling in March 2016 that US regulation of central clearing counterparties (CCPs) is
equivalent for the purpose of EU market access, following agreement in February 2016 between the
Commission and the US Commodities Futures Trading Commission on a ‘common approach’.
43 These interests may be all the stronger given the intensification of political oversight over regulators
over the crisis era: Gadinis (2013b).
44 European Parliament (2016).
458 N. Moloney
123
established) internationally, although the ECB also participates where monetary
and, since the establishment of Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism
(SSM), bank supervisory matters arise.45 In the FSB, the Commission and the ECB
are currently members of the 54-member decision-making plenary session, along
with the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain (represented by
their finance ministries, central banks, and/or other regulators). In the Basel
Committee, the ECB—which has two ‘seats’ (one as monetary authority and one as
bank supervisor within the SSM)—sits alongside the national bank regulators and
central banks of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, and the UK as a full voting member—although in practice the Basel
Committee operates by consensus. The Commission has non-voting observer
status.46 On IOSCO, the Commission has associate member (non-voting) status,
while the EU’s national securities markets regulators are ordinary voting members
and six national regulators are permanent members of the 33-member decision-
making (standard-setting) IOSCO Board (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
the UK, and Spain).47 The Commission sits (with voting rights) on the oversight
body of the IFRS Foundation—the IFRS Foundation Monitoring Board—together
with a number of major (non-EU) regulators and IOSCO. On the IAIS, the
Commission is a member of the general meeting, along with the EU’s national
insurance regulators, but it does not exercise voting rights. The 24-member IAIS
executive committee, which has five national regulator members, does not include
the Commission.48
The incentives and preferences which shape the EU’s engagement with
international financial governance through the ISSBs are therefore complex and
inter-related, and EU and national interests co-exist and are represented through
multiple channels. But since the 2011 establishment of the ESAs the nature of the
EU’s engagement with international financial governance, and of the related
incentives and preferences, has begun to change. Under their founding regula-
tions,49 the ESAs have a series of quasi-regulatory and supervisory powers.50 They
can propose certain forms of administrative rule (‘Binding Technical Standards’) for
adoption by the Commission, provide the Commission with ‘Technical Advice’ on
administrative rule-making generally, and adopt different forms of soft law. They
have also been conferred with a range of supervisory coordination and convergence
powers, including data collection and peer review powers, the power to review
certain national supervisory decisions, and powers in relation to ESA participation
45 For an account of the ECB’s representative functions internationally, see Letter from ECB President
Draghi to MEP Sven Gielgold, 17 December 2015 (L.MD/15/683).
46 Quaglia (2015).
47 In addition, three EU regulators are currently elected to the Board (Belgium, Greece, and Sweden):
Conac (2015).
48 Lowet (2015).
49 European Banking Authority (EBA) Regulation (EU) No 1093/2020, OJ 2010 L331/12; European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010, OJ 2010 L331/
48; and European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, OJ 2010
L331/84.
50 See, e.g., Moloney (2014a), at pp. 854-1009, Busuioc (2013), and Schammo (2011).
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in colleges of supervisors; a limited range of powers to direct national regulators in
specified circumstances; and, in the case of ESMA, specified direct supervisory and
enforcement powers over a limited group of market participants and activities
(credit rating agencies, OTC derivatives market trade repositories, position
management, short selling, and the marketing of certain investment products51).
The ESAs have also been given a series of powers with respect to international
financial governance. These administrative powers address supervisory cooperation
and coordination, including the facilitation of information exchange and of
cooperation agreements between Member State regulators and third countries, and
participation in international organisations.52 They also relate to the EU’s
multiplicity of equivalence-based market-access mechanisms, in relation to which
the ESAs are typically empowered to advise the Commission as to whether a
particular third country’s financial governance arrangements are equivalent to those
of the EU.53 The ESAs’ relatively limited formal powers do not, however, fully
reflect the extent to which the ESAs have de facto constructed a new administrative
channel for EU engagement with international financial governance, as is discussed
with respect to ESMA in Sect. 4.
3.2 Aligned Incentives and Powers?
While all three ESAs have a similar set of formal powers with respect to
international financial governance, they also share related incentives and prefer-
ences. The ESAs, established in 2011, are still youthful administrative actors, but
they are maturing and testing their powers—and they are doing so under the
‘shadow of hierarchy’,54 notably the Commission’s ‘shadow’, which has the
potential to significantly shape their incentives and preferences. This shadow relates
to the nature of administrative governance in the EU. The regulatory demands of the
single market have led to a massive expansion in the EU administrative state and to
a related material ‘agencification’ of EU governance generally.55 But the operating
environment for EU agencies is highly restrictive. With respect to rule-making—the
typical province of domestic agencies—under the EU Treaties the Commission is
the constitutional location for administrative rule-making. However functionally
desirable it may be, technocratically expert EU agencies may not adopt adminis-
trative rules. With respect to supervision—similarly the usual province of domestic
agencies—EU constitutional arrangements prevent agencies from being empowered
to take discretionary decisions unless appropriate conditions apply, in order to
51 EBA is also empowered to prohibit certain deposit-related investment products.
52 2010 EBA, EIOPA and ESMA Regulations, Art. 33 empower the ESAs to develop contacts and enter
into administrative arrangements with supervisory authorities, international organisations, and the
administrations of third countries. More specific ESA powers relating to international coordination and
information exchange are contained in the sectoral directives and regulations of EU financial regulation.
53 Art. 33 requires the ESAs to assist in preparing equivalence decisions. More specific requirements
relating to assisting the Commission on equivalence decisions, and directions as to the issues the ESAs
must consider, are set out in the sectoral directives and regulations of EU financial regulation.
54 See He´ritier and Lehmkuhl (2008).
55 For discussion, see Craig (2015).
460 N. Moloney
123
protect the institutional balance set up under the Treaties (the famous Meroni
doctrine56). Accordingly, the Commission is the administrative rule-maker for the
EU financial system, and the ESAs’ ability to take supervisory decisions is
constrained.57 The ESAs have therefore strong incentives to assert their institutional
position and to strengthen their credibility as regulatory agencies through means
which do not threaten the constitutional and political limits within which they
operate.58 The operational/coordination activities which currently define interna-
tional financial governance make available to the ESAs a sphere of operation which
is relatively uncontroversial. They also provide potentially fruitful opportunities for
expert specialisation and for the strengthening of the ESAs’ institutional position
which are relatively free from political and constitutional constraints and risks. This
is all the more the case as the ESAs are currently being relieved of the intense
resource burdens associated with the delivery of the administrative standards
required under the crisis-era regulatory reform programme. All three ESAs have
until recently been primarily preoccupied with quasi-regulatory matters. EIOPA’s
activities have been dominated by the vast administrative rule-book required for the
Solvency II regime.59 EBA has been focused on the delivery of the rules which
support the behemoth 2013 Capital Requirements Directive IV/Capital Require-
ments Regulation regime and the 2014 Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.60
ESMA has had the heaviest load to carry in terms of rule development—its mandate
included the dense administrative rule-book required for the 2014 Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive II/Regulation,61 the leviathan of EU financial
market regulation. That regulatory pressure is now lifting and the extent to which
the ESAs are now turning to the more operational supervisory convergence and
coordination activities which are beginning to shape international financial
governance is striking, as is clear from—to take only a representative sample—
ESMA’s new supervisory convergence agenda;62 EBA’s multi-faceted activities
related to the ‘SREP’ (the operational Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process
required to be undertaken by the supervisors of EU banks);63 and EIOPA’s
2015-2017 work programme on supervision.64
The persistence of structural differences across national economies and financial
systems in the EU and of related divergences in national regulatory preferences, as
well as the intergovernmental quality of ESA Board of Supervisors decision-making
(decision-making is the prerogative of the national regulators who sit on the Boards
and operate under a qualified majority vote), limit the extent to which the ESAs can
56 Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority [1957-1958] ECR 133.
57 See further Moloney (2014a), at chapters X and XI.
58 Ibid, at pp. 976–1007.
59 Directive 2009/138/EU, OJ 2009 L335/1.
60 Directive 2013/36/EU, OJ 2013 L176/338, and Regulation EU No 575/2013, OJ L 2013 176/1; and
Directive 2014/59/EU, OJ 2014 L173/90.
61 Directive 2014/65/EU, OJ 2014 L173/349, and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, OJ 2014 L173/84.
62 ESMA (2016a).
63 See, e.g., EBA (2014) and EBA (2016a).
64 EIOPA (2015a), at pp. 7–9.
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operate as representatives of collective EU preferences. So also do the competences
of the Commission and the ECB with respect to the ISSBs. But it is nonetheless
becoming clear that the ESAs are creating a new mAgreement which governs
cooperation andeans for the EU to engage with international financial governance
and the ISSBs. All the ESAs are represented on their major sectoral ISSBs. Unlike
the Commission, EIOPA is a voting member of the general meeting of the IAIS and
of the IAIS executive committee.65 The EBA position is different. By contrast with
the Commission and ECB, EBA does not have a formal, voting presence on the
Basel Committee. It has, nonetheless, considerable opportunities to exert influence,
being represented by its Chairperson on the Basel Committee’s influential Group of
Governors and Heads of Supervisors and by its Executive Director in the plenary
session of the Basel Committee; it is also represented in a number of working
groups.66 While EBA cannot vote, in practice Basel Committee discussions are
consensus based and EBA is technically well equipped to represent the collective
interests of EU banking regulators, where any can be established.67 As discussed in
Sect. 4, ESMA is represented on IOSCO and is actively engaged with the IFRS
Foundation. Across the IAIS, Basel Committee, IOSCO, and the IFRS Foundation,
the three ESAs are all, albeit to different degrees, active and, again to different
degrees, are displaying a strengthening regulatory capacity to exert influence and
impose EU preferences.
While the ESAs have much in common with respect to international financial
governance, this discussion focuses on ESMA as the operating environments of the
ESAs internationally are in some respects distinct. In the case of EIOPA, although it
has asserted its commitment to engagement with the IAIS68 and is a permanent
member of the IAIS executive committee, international financial governance in the
area of insurance is less well developed as compared to in the banking and securities
markets. The IAIS was established in 1994 (the Basel Committee and IOSCO were
established in 1974 and 1983 respectively) and has only recently come to prominence
in international financial governance. Its activities intensified as the global reform
agenda turned to financial stability over the financial crisis, in particular following the
establishment of the FSB in 2009 and the related priority given to the identification and
management of the risks of global systemically important insurers and to the adoption
of international capital standards for globally active insurance groups. The IAIS is also
increasingly active with respect to information exchange, supervisory coordination,
and peer review.69 There is, nonetheless, only a relatively limited empirical basis for
examination of EIOPA, although initial indications suggest an influential EIOPA
voice on the IAIS and an EIOPA commitment to international engagement.70
65 Lowet (2015), at pp. 15–16.
66 Quaglia (2015), at p. 12.
67 For discussion of EBA’s role in the Basel Committee, see Moloney (2017) and Quaglia (2015).
68 See, e.g., EIOPA (2015a), at p. 12.
69 See recently IAIS (2014).
70 Lowet (2015). In July 2016, e.g., EIOPA joined the IAIS International Information Exchange




By contrast with EIOPA, EBA operates in a sophisticated and mature segment of
international financial governance, the main architecture for which is provided by
extensive Basel Committee and FSB standards. EBA has, however, distinct incentives
to the other two ESAs with respect to international engagement which derive from the
increasingly brittle institutional architecture that supports EU banking governance.
This brittle quality is a function of the disjunction between the institutional governance
of the single bankingmarket (covering the EU’s current 28Member States and EBA’s
remit) and that of Banking Union/the SSM (currently covering the euro area’s 19
Member States and primarily the remit of the ECB within the SSM). EBA is charged
with supporting the amplification and application of theEU’s single banking rule-book
through its quasi-rule-making powers. It is also charged with driving pan-EU
supervisory convergence in how this rule-book is applied. The ECB, at the centre of
the SSM, is responsible for oversight of the SSMand for the direct supervision of some
129 banking groups. It must apply the EU banking rule-book and is subject to EBA’s
supervisory convergence and othermeasures. But the potential for destructive tensions
and confusion as EBA and the ECB/SSM interact and their respective spheres of
competence overlap is considerable. EBA’s engagement with international financial
governance must therefore be situated within the wider EBA/ECB/SSM relationship
and the distinct incentives it generates. On the one hand, EBA has strong incentives to
focus its resources and its political/institutional capital on protecting its position
within the EU, particularly given the ECB’s constitutionally and substantively more
powerful position.71 On the other hand, international financial governance may
provide a means for EBA to strengthen its capacity and, at the same time, to build a
productive relationship with the ECB by their collectively promoting EU interests
through what might be termed an EU ‘axis of expertise’, particularly as the ECB is
developing an international supervisory presence through Memoranda of Under-
standing with third-country bank supervisors72 as well as its seat on the Basel
Committee. EBA’s incentives are, however, likely to be dynamic and, at the moment,
are hard to predict as Brexit is likely to destabilise an already delicate institutional
equilibrium. On the UK’s exit from the EU, one of the major frictions preventing euro
area/Banking Union interests and preferences from dictating the shape of single
market financial governance will be removed—as is clear from the February 2016
NewSettlementwhich theUKnegotiated andwhichwas in part designed to protect the
single market from euro area caucusing.73 It is hard to dismiss speculation that further
centralisation of institutional governance will occur, particularly given political
support in the euro area for a ‘Financial Union’,74 and that EBA’s role may change
significantly.
71 See further Ferran (2015) and Moloney (2014b).
72 ECB (2015a), at p. 26.
73 Decision of the Heads of State or Government meeting within the European Council, concerning a
new settlement for the United Kingdom with the European Union, European Council Meeting, 18 and 19
February 2016, EUCO 1/16 (Annex 1).
74 Notably in the ‘Five Presidents’ Report’: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union,
report by Jean-Claude Juncker, in close cooperation with Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario
Draghi and Martin Schulz (2015). On Financial Union and its implications for institutional governance,
see further Moloney (2016).
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While all three ESAs are therefore becoming increasingly significant adminis-
trative actors in international financial governance, ESMA provides the most
extensive and stable case study and is considered in the following Section.
4 ESMA and International Financial Governance
4.1 ESMA Incentives and Powers
Like EBA and EIOPA, ESMA has significant incentives to engage with
international financial governance as a means for strengthening its institutional
position. The limitations on its capacity to operate as a quasi-rule-maker are clear
from the occasions on which the Commission has rejected or revised ESMA’s
proposals for Binding Technical Standards or Technical Advice.75 These destabil-
ising episodes are exceptional, but they underline the hierarchically inferior position
of ESMA despite its technocratic expertise. ESMA also operates with a degree of
constitutional ambiguity with respect to its supervisory powers. Its novel power to
impose prohibitions or conditions on short selling in national markets, for example,
was challenged by the UK as being in breach of, inter alia, the Meroni principle.
Although the 2014 ruling by the Court of Justice of the EU found the power to be
valid,76 ESMA has significant incentives to deploy its direct supervisory and
enforcement powers sparingly so as to manage litigation risk. And while—by
contrast with EBA—the ECB/SSM does not yet pose a direct challenge to ESMA,77
the increasing global interest of prudential regulators in securities market risks—
clear from the current and contested focus on the risks which asset management
poses to financial stability78—may come to pose a threat to ESMA’s reach over EU
securities markets. This is all the more the case as conduct risk, the traditional
purview of securities regulators, is being clawed into the sphere of influence of
prudential regulators.79
International financial governance, however, affords ESMA opportunities to
strengthen its capacity and institutional position. The field is not clear for ESMA.
The disruptive effects of Member State interests aside, the Commission has long
provided collective EU representation with respect to securities market matters
(IOSCO) and financial reporting (IFRS Foundation). It is also the main actor in the
bilateral Joint EU-US Financial Regulatory Forum with respect to financial market
75 The lengthy and complex 2014 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II /Regulation rule-making
process most recently illustrates the tensions, with ESMA robustly resisting changes the Commission
made to certain of its proposals: ESMA Opinion, 30 May 2016 (ESMA/2016/730).
76 Case C-270/12 UK v Council and Parliament, 22 January 2014.
77 See further Moloney (2015).
78 Best illustrated by the FSB’s recent controversial reform initiatives (notably FSB (2016)).
79 Conduct risk formed part of the 2016 stress testing of EU banks EBA (2016b). Internationally, the
FSB has recently focused on misconduct as a threat to financial stability: FSB (2015d) and FSB Chairman
Letter to G20 Leaders, November 2015.
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matters.80 But ESMA has been conferred with a series of formal powers with
respect to international financial governance and is emerging as an effective
presence internationally. Despite a significant budget cut for 2015, ESMA chose not
to weaken its international activities that year,81 while its 2016 Work Programme
showed a similar commitment to international engagement.82 The main channels
through which ESMA engages with international financial governance are discussed
below.
4.2 Equivalence Decisions
In the wake of the Brexit decision much attention has focused on the equivalence
determinations which the UK may become subject to as a third country seeking
access to the EU single market. Any such decisions will be heavily influenced by
ESMA, which has become a key actor in this area.
A complex patchwork of rules applies to equivalence determinations in EU
financial markets law. Some EU measures do not address or harmonise the third-
country access decision, leaving it to the Member States. Others, however, require a
positive equivalence determination prior to access being permitted by the Member
State in question. In some measures detailed conditions specify how the decision is
to be taken, in others there is limited specification. Typically, the Commission,
advised by ESMA, must adopt a positive equivalence decision before a Member
State can choose to admit a third-country actor.83 Equivalence applies not only to
formal regulatory equivalence, but also to third-country supervision and enforce-
ment regimes.84 A positive equivalence decision is also required where the market
access decision is made at EU level (in effect by ESMA) and before the limited
group of third-country actors which are eligible for EU access through ESMA
registration can be so registered.85
80 The Forum originally took the form of the ‘Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue’. Its recasting as a
Forum in July 2016 did not see the ESAs become more prominent, formally at least: Commission,
Improvements in EU-U.S. Regulatory Cooperation, 18 July 2016.
81 International activities were not included among the originally planned activities which ESMA
subsequently removed from its 2015 Annual Work Plan, following its 15% budget cut (ESMA/2014/1200
Rev, at pp. 32–33).
82 ESMA, Work Programme 2016 (ESMA/2015/1475), noting, e.g., cooperation with IOSCO on a
number of fronts, coordination with the FSB on benchmark regulation, and a commitment to international
activities generally.
83 On the EU approach to the prospectus, investment services, credit rating agency, alternative
investment fund and OTC derivative sectors, see Moloney (2014a), at pp. 122–124, 404–407, 677–682,
307–311 and 615–629.
84 E.g., 2014 Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation, Art. 47.
85 E.g., 2012 European Market Infrastructure Regulation [Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 2012
201/1], Art. 25 (third-country CCPs) and Art. 77 (third-country trade repositories); and 2011 Credit
Rating Agency Regulation [Regulation (EU) No 513/2011, OJ L 2011 145/30], Arts. 4 and 5 (third-
country rating agencies).
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Any equivalence determination is discretionary and judgment based as it
typically relates equivalence to outcomes.86 It therefore places ESMA, in advising
the Commission, at the heart of complex and politically sensitive market access
determinations associated with state ‘power as autonomy’,87 and in a position
accordingly to exert and strengthen EU influence internationally. A somewhat
timorous approach might have been expected: ESMA, as a youthful actor, has
strong incentives to build effective relationships with regulators internationally and
similarly strong incentives not to antagonise major global market operators. Its
approach has nonetheless been robust and suggests an ability to establish a credible
presence in international financial governance. With respect to rating agency
regulation equivalence, for example, it adopted a relatively intrusive approach.88
With respect to asset manager market access, ESMA provoked some consternation
in the global fund market in July 2015 when it declined to offer an opinion (as
required under the complex third-country access requirements of the 2011
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive89) as to whether the regulatory
‘passport’ to the single market currently enjoyed by EU funds and their managers
should be extended to funds and managers from a series of jurisdictions, including
Hong Kong and the US, given insufficient data.90 ESMA finally adopted a ‘positive’
opinion in July 2016 with respect to access by a number of third-country
jurisdictions, including Canada and Switzerland. The opinion revealed the granular
and detailed analysis which ESMA had undertaken, including with respect to the
operation of relevant MoUs, authorisation procedures, investor protection, and
enforcement capacity.91 It also underlined ESMA’s willingness to adopt a firm
approach. ESMA declined to adopt a positive opinion in relation to certain
jurisdictions, and adopted a qualified approach to others (including the US and Hong
Kong). It has also, however, shown itself as politically adept. The protracted
equivalence negotiations on central clearing counterparty (CCP) equivalence
between the EU and US involved high-level Commission discussions as well as
technical ESMA negotiations. Ultimately, the issue was resolved at Commission/US
Commodities Futures Trading Commission level in February 2016 by means of the
adoption of a ‘common approach’.92 ESMA subsequently indicated that ‘it would
do everything within its powers’ to shorten the related ESMA procedures for
86 As is the case, e.g., with respect to equivalence determinations relating to the equivalence of CCP
regimes.
87 Helleiner and Pagliari (2011).
88 ESMA’s equivalence assessment follows an ‘objective’ approach, based on the capacity of the third-
country regime to meet the objectives of the EU regime. It focuses in particular on the scope of the
regulatory and supervisory framework, corporate governance, conflicts of interest management,
organisational requirements, quality of methodologies and of ratings, disclosure, and effective supervision
and enforcement: ESMA (2012a), at pp. 5–6.
89 Directive 2011/61/EU, OJ 2011 L174/1.
90 While the exercise was not formally an equivalence assessment, it involved a similar assessment.
ESMA declined to reach a view given concerns related to competition, regulation, and a lack of sufficient
evidence to properly assess the relevant criteria: ESMA (2015a).
91 ESMA (2016b).
92 See supra n. 42. The formal equivalence decisions by the Commission followed in March 2016.
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registering third-country CCPs within the EU (by June 2016 any third-country CCP
was required to be assessed as subject to an equivalent regime to the EU regime, and
registered by ESMA, in order to be eligible to clear certain instruments in the EU).93
Overall, recent experience suggests that ESMA has significantly enhanced the
EU’s ability to make independent, potentially unpopular, and technically robust
equivalence determinations and so to drive (or ‘cross-load’) the imposition of EU
preferences internationally, particularly where jurisdictions are required to adapt
their regime to the EU requirements.94 But, and perhaps paradoxically as market
access decisions can generate regulatory friction, it also suggests that ESMA may
come to strengthen international financial governance by developing and deepening
contacts with peer regulators internationally (not least as EU equivalence/market
access tests typically impose requirements relating to international information
exchange and supervisory cooperation agreements) and increasing understanding of
regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement processes internationally.
4.3 Financial Reporting and the IFRS Foundation
The EU/IFRS Foundation relationship is a key one for the EU. IFRS, adopted by the
IFRS Foundation, are the mandatory EU financial reporting standards for the
consolidated accounts of EU firms listed on ‘first tier’ trading venues (or ‘regulated
markets’). Much of EU/IFRS Foundation engagement has historically taken place
through the Commission. More recently, an EU committee (the Accounting
Regulatory Committee—ARC) and a technical advisory group (the European
Financial Reporting Advisory Group—EFRAG), both of which advise the
Commission on its adoption for the EU of IFRS (through the IFRS ‘endorsement’
process), have played supporting roles. ESMA, however, has recently emerged as a
significant actor in EU/IFRS Foundation relations. Directly enjoined to address
financial reporting,95 well equipped to exploit a fragmented EU institutional
environment which has multiple national and EU-level components,96 and
committed to enhancing IFRS convergence,97 ESMA has moved to claim ownership
over IFRS Foundation engagement and looks set to strengthen EU influence.
ESMA has engaged actively with the IFRS Foundation on the development of
IFRS.98 It has also carved out an oversight role with respect to the application of
IFRS in the EU. It has, for example, produced a series of own-initiative statements
on IFRS which cover, inter alia, the quality of financial reporting and the avoidance
93 ESMA Statement, 10 February 2016 (ESMA/2016/278).
94 As was the case with respect to US rating agency regulation.
95 2010 ESMA Regulation Art. 29(1)(c).
96 The IFRS Foundation has noted that it is difficult for the EU to present a consistent position given the
different national bodies and EU-level bodies which engage with the IFRS Foundation: Maystadt (2013).
97 ESMA Chairman Maijoor highlighted in his first term that pan-EU coordination of IFRS was one of
ESMA’s primary objectives: Speech on ‘Developments in European Financial Reporting’, 12 November
2012.
98 In 2014, e.g., ESMA provided 21 comment letters on various IFRS consultations and agenda matters:
ESMA (2015b), at p. 4. In 2015, it provided some 11 responses and engaged in multiple working groups:
ESMA (2016c), at pp. 26–27.
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of ‘boiler plate’,99 the treatment of loan forbearance practices,100 and the treatment
of sovereign debt disclosures.101 While in all cases ESMA has been careful to
underline that it does not interpret IFRS, and so does not seek to overstep the IFRS
Foundation’s interpretive jurisdiction, it typically also stresses that national
authorities should reflect its approach in their local IFRS enforcement activities
and that auditors and firms in the EU should consider its findings. Similarly, through
its European Enforcers Coordination Sessions (EECS),102 which are designed to
support EU convergence on IFRS enforcement decisions, ESMA has reviewed
national enforcement of IFRS. ESMA has also adopted common enforcement
priorities for national enforcement authorities with respect to IFRS application.103
ESMA’s engagement may, however, exacerbate long-standing EU/IFRS Foun-
dation tensions, to the detriment of the EU’s effectiveness in imposing its
preferences, and generate risks to the integrity of IFRS globally. The Foundation’s
interests as a private standard-setting body, with a global agenda and open to an
array of influences,104 have at times conflicted with the particular interests pursued
by the EU. In 2004, for example, the IAS 39 fracas, which led to the EU ‘carving
out’ from the IAS 39 standard in order to protect parts of the EU banking sector,
generated an international furore given the threat to the global integrity of IFRS.105
Tensions emerged again over the financial crisis when, under pressure from the EU,
the Foundation made an urgent reform to IAS 39 to reflect the severe market
volatility and illiquidity which was causing difficulties for mark-to-market
valuations by EU banks. Although the EU has often been successful in imposing
its preferences,106 EU/IFRS Foundation relations can be unstable and the
consequences for global IFRS consistency prejudicial. These difficulties may be
exacerbated by ESMA’s intensifying engagement, to the detriment of both the EU’s
ability to impose its preferences and the IFRS Foundation’s ability to achieve
convergence on the application of IFRS. In particular, any incursions by ESMA into
what might be perceived as the interpretation of IFRS may generate tensions.
Difficulties may also arise within the EU. Significant tensions already exist between
ESMA and the ARC/EFRAG bodies involved in the EU IFRS endorsement process,
and these may destabilise wider EU/IFRS Foundation relations.107 And the potential
for prejudicial Commission/ESMA tensions is not insignificant given the
99 ESMA/2015/1609.
100 ESMA/2012/853.
101 ESMA/2011/226 and ESMA/2011/397.
102 Composed of some 37 financial reporting enforcement authorities from across the EU and EEA.
103 The common enforcement priorities for the 2015 financial statements of listed firms include the




106 Quaglia (2014a), at pp. 129–146.
107 ESMA and the other ESAs have expressed strong opposition to the persistence of private sector
involvement on EFRAG and have refused to sit as voting members on EFRAG (ESA-2014-001).
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Commission’s role as the EU representative on the IFRS Foundation Monitoring
Board as well as its long history in leading the EU charge on issues of IFRS
controversy.
Some signs augur well, however, at least from an EU effectiveness perspective.
ESMA’s extensive experience in collating data from national IFRS enforcers in the
EU, in developing collective Board of Supervisors’ positions on IFRS consultations,
and in consulting and engaging with an array of stakeholders on IFRS allows it to
engage with the IFRS Foundation from a position of strength, even if the technical
adoption/endorsement of IFRS for the EU is carried out by the Commission. ESMA
has achieved an early success in the form of a 2014 Protocol on ESMA and IFRS
Foundation cooperation which clarifies ESMA’s role with respect to the Foundation
and the Foundation’s commitment to operational cooperation with ESMA.108
Similarly, ESMA/IFRS Foundation communications over the 2015 Review of
Structure and Effectiveness of the IFRS Foundation appear to have been
productive.109 Through its IFRS Foundation engagement ESMA has also opened
up another channel through which long-standing EU dissatisfaction with the failure
of the US to adopt IFRS110 and the EU’s perception that the US is over-represented
on the Foundation111 can be communicated. Overall, the EU’s ability to impose its
preferences can be expected to strengthen.
From the perspective of the IFRS Foundation, ESMA engagement should
strengthen the Foundation’s effectiveness internationally. The more concentrated
management of EU relations through ESMA—a technocratic and not overtly
political actor—should at least minimise EU/Foundation tensions, as long as ESMA
is careful in its management of IFRS interpretations. The ability of ESMA to ‘up-
load’ to the Foundation the collective EU experience with the implementation and
application of IFRS should enhance the ability of the Foundation to revise and
refresh IFRS: for example, over 2016, ESMA is to review experience with a number
of IFRS standards and to contribute thereby to the Foundation’s review.112 ESMA
engagement may also strengthen the global diffusion of IFRS. ESMA’s oversight of
enforcement within the EU of IFRS application strengthens the consistency with
which IFRS are applied in the EU. ESMA may also prompt the diffusion of IFRS
more generally. To take a live example, ESMA is playing an active part in the
current EU Capital Markets Union-related discussions on whether a tailored (non-
IFRS) harmonised EU reporting standard should apply to firms admitted to the EU’s
‘second tier’ trading venues (to which IFRS do not apply). The related debate
108 IFRS Foundation and ESMA Statement of Protocols for Cooperation on IFRS, 9 July 2014.
109 In its response to the Review, ESMA noted that it supported the basic elements of the governance
structure and the enhancements proposed by the IFRS Foundation, although it called for more efforts to
be made to support public accountability (ESMA/2015/1738).
110 SEC Chief Accountant J Schnurr, Remarks before the 2015 Baruch College Financial Reporting
Conference, 7 May 2015.
111 See, e.g., European Commission (2010).
112 ESMA (2016c), at p. 25.
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touches on the role of the IFRS ‘SME standard’113 which cannot be applied to
trading venues.114 Whether or not the EU ultimately adopts a new accounting
standard for these venues (initial indications suggest not115), the debate may signal
the potential of the IFRS SME standard as a means for supporting SME access to
finance in other jurisdictions.116 Similarly, ESMA may support the consistent global
diffusion of IFRS 9, the important but controversial new accounting standard which
forms part of the G20 reform agenda and which addresses, inter alia, the reporting
of impaired loans and has major implications for reporting by banks. Following the
July 2014 adoption of the standard by the IFRS Foundation, the ‘endorsement’
process is underway in the EU.117 ESMA urged that the standard should be endorsed
by the EU on a ‘timely basis’; called for early application in the EU; and rejected
with some force EFRAG’s initial suggestion that the application of IFRS 9 to certain
aspects of insurance business be deferred, warning that a ‘European carve-out’
would not be a feasible solution.118 While it remains to be seen whether an EU-
specific change to IFRS 9 will be adopted with respect to insurance business,
ESMA’s intervention underlines its ability to bring a robust technical capacity to
bear and its concern to reduce the risk of the EU disrupting the international
consistency of IFRS.
4.4 IOSCO and International Financial Market Standards and Supervision
ESMA is also developing a strong international presence on other ISSBs, notably
IOSCO, which has previously been regarded as a weak point with respect to the
EU’s ability to impose its preferences, particularly in the face of US power.119
ESMA, like the Commission, is a non-voting associate member of IOSCO. But
unlike the Commission, ESMA enjoys observer status on the IOSCO Board and on a
range of Board policy committees, reflecting its distinct supervisory compe-
tences.120 This enhancement of ESMA’s role is not only a consequence of its
distinct powers, however. It can also be explained as reflecting the array of channels
113 ‘IFRS for SMEs’ were originally adopted in 2009. They require some 90% fewer disclosures than
full-blown IFRS. The standards can be used by any jurisdiction—whether or not it has adopted IFRS—but
not by listed companies or by financial institutions.
114 ESMA (2015c), at pp. 9–10.
115 Stakeholder reaction has tended to be hostile (e.g., European Parliament, Resolution on building a
Capital Markets Union, 1 July 2015 (B8-0655/2015), para. 6).
116 As at May 2014, 78 jurisdictions were using the standard: IFRS Foundation, IFRS for SMEs Fact
Sheet, February 2016.
117 In May 2015, EFRAG produced its draft endorsement advice for the Commission which provided
that the standard complied with the technical endorsement criteria which apply under EU law to IFRS
endorsement but suggested a deferral might be required with respect to its insurance-related elements. In
September 2015, EFRAG subsequently confirmed its view that the standard be endorsed. The ARC
subsequently voted in favour of endorsement in June 2016 and endorsement by the Commission is
expected by the end of 2016.
118 ESMA Letter to EFRAG, EFRAG Draft Endorsement Advice on Adoption of IFRS 9, 29 June 2015
(ESMA/2015/1056).




through which ESMA has come to build its capacity and credibility among the
community of international securities regulators and the strengthening influence of
the EU accordingly.
Much of ESMA’s interaction with IOSCO arises from ESMA’s support of the
IOSCO standards which have been adopted on foot of the G20 reform agenda and
which ESMA has used to develop the EU’s administrative rule-book, whether
through its proposals for Binding Technical Standards or its Technical Advice.121
ESMA has also drawn on IOSCO standards in its own-initiative work. In developing
its own-initiative 2012 Guidelines on automated and algorithmic trading it liaised
closely with IOSCO.122 Similarly, its 2013 own-initiative Guidelines on the
treatment of benchmarks123 reflected IOSCO’s standards in this area.124
ESMA is also building independent relationships with the securities market
regulators which sit on IOSCO through its information-exchange and cooperation-
based powers and activities. Under the 2011 Alternative Investment Fund Managers
Directive ESMA centrally negotiated cooperation arrangements (MoUs) between its
constituent member regulators and 50 third-country regulators (more than 1,000
bilateral MoUs were adopted), based on an ESMA MoU template agreed by its
Board of Supervisors. As well as deepening ESMA’s relationship with third-country
regulators, this significant operational success125 sent a clear signal internationally
as to ESMA’s ability to act on behalf of its member regulators in international
negotiations and as to the willingness of its member regulators to confer a mandate
on ESMA to negotiate on their behalf. Less dramatically—but with no less practical
importance given their novelty and their capacity to signal ESMA’s credibility—
ESMA bilaterally entered into a number of MoUs with leading third-country
regulators relating to third-country CCP registration by ESMA.126
ESMA has also established a technical presence on the FSB127 and is active in
the more informal bodies which support international regulatory coordination. Chief
among these are the OTC Derivatives Regulators Group and Forum (ODRG and
ODRF) through which ESMA works with other major regulators to address gaps
and inconsistencies in the implementation of the G20 OTC derivatives market
121 E.g., the extensive organisational, conduct, and prudential EU administrative rules which apply to
CCPs and which were developed by ESMA are based in part on the 2012 CPSS-IOSCO Principles for
Financial Market Infrastructures.
122 ESMA (2012b). Throughout the Guidelines’ development, ESMA emphasised its engagement with
international developments, including IOSCO’s work on direct market access (Consultation Paper
ESMA/2011/224, at pp. 7–8).
123 ESMA/EBA (2013).
124 Over 2013, IOSCO produced two major consultations on principles for financial benchmarks and in
July 2013 adopted its Principles for Financial Benchmarks.
125 ESMA Chairman Maijoor described the MoU process as an important step which helped the EU to
speak with one voice, ensured a level playing field and greater negotiation efficiency, and ‘was in some
ways a perfect illustration of what the new ESFS can achieve’: Speech on ESMA—Issues and Priorities, 5
November 2013 (ESMA/2013/1582).
126 For an example, see the MoU between the Australian regulator (ASIC) and ESMA, available at
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/esma_asic_mou_2.pdf. As noted in Sect. 4.2 above, ESMA is
required to register third-country CCPs operating in the EU.
127 Through the FSB’s ‘Legal Entity Identifier’ Workstream.
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reform agenda.128 ESMA is active on the current FSB and ODRF work streams on
improving access to and use of the massive data set now emerging from trade
repositories for OTC derivatives markets data.129 The difficulties associated with
the usability of this operationally critical data set include problems with respect to
data quality, usability, and aggregation (including on a cross-border basis).130 With
the ability to communicate the collective experience of (at present) 28 markets and
regulators, ESMA is strongly placed to influence remedial and reform initiatives.
Similarly, ESMA is entering into agreements with regulators internationally who do
not have access to trade repository data.131
ESMA’s supervisory activities, and in particular its role as direct EU supervisor
of the three major global rating agency groups, its responsibility for registering
certain actors authorised in third countries, and its oversight role in relation to the
EU’s novel cross-border supervisory colleges for CCPs,132 are also likely to
strengthen its international network of securities regulators and its credibility on
operational supervisory matters and coordination challenges.
The ability of the EU to impose, via ESMA, its preferences on IOSCO is,
accordingly, likely to strengthen. With respect to the implications for IOSCO and
for international financial governance, ESMA strengthens the EU’s regulatory
capacity to support the global diffusion of IOSCO standards and their effective
implementation. Where ESMA incorporates IOSCO standards in its Technical
Advice or in its proposed Binding Technical Standards, it acts as a ‘hardening’ or
‘legalising’ mechanism: it signals the credibility of the standard and supports its
global diffusion—the standard may also be ‘hardened’ where equivalence
requirements follow.133 ESMA can also ‘harden’ a standard through its own-
initiative soft law activities which provide an additional administrative means
through which IOSCO standards can be diffused. Beyond standard implementation,
ESMA’s operational experience with peer review, data management, supervisory
coordination and convergence, and risk monitoring—derived in a regional/multi-
lateral context—is likely to enhance IOSCO’s ability to manage difference and
coordination on a global basis. For example, ESMA has enhanced its peer review
tools,134 has expanded its peer review activities,135 and is increasingly adopting a
128 ESMA (2015d), at p. 64, and ESMA (2016d), at p. 18.
129 It has called for the Forum’s mandate to be extended to cover the efficient use of trade repository
data: ESMA (2015d), at p. 63.
130 FSB (2015e), at pp. 21–22.
131 Its first access agreement was signed with the Australian regulator (ASIC) in 2014: ESMA (2015d),
at p. 63.
132 ESMA’s responsibilities include peer review of colleges and stress testing. See ESMA (2015e) and
ESMA (2016e).
133 Bach and Newman (2014).
134 Following the recommendation of the IMF that its peer review function become less peer-driven and
more ESMA-led [IMF (2013), at p. 14]. Peer review is a standing item on the agenda of the ESMA Board
of Supervisors. Recent refinements include new principles governing stakeholder engagement in peer
review (ESMA/2016/632).
135 Recent examples include its peer review of market abuse supervision (ESMA/2015/1905), short
selling rule application (ESMA/2015/1791), and suitability requirements supervision (ESMA/2016/584).
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more critical and searching tone in its reviews of its constituent national
regulators.136 It can be expected to share this expertise to strengthen its credibility
and capacity in IOSCO, which is now subject to requests from the FSB to carry out
peer reviews.137
There is a risk of disruption. National regulators ultimately determine decision-
making in the ESMA Board of Supervisors. ESMA’s mandate to act on behalf of the
Board of Supervisors may, accordingly, change and be disrupted by national
interests. Internal institutional tensions may also arise with the Commission if
ESMA begins to eclipse it on IOSCO.138 Overall, however, ESMA’s incentives and
powers and the shifting nature of international financial governance suggest that its
influence internationally—and the EU’s ability to impose its preferences—will
strengthen.
5 The Impact of Brexit on the ‘Agencification’ of EU Financial
Governance
On exit from the EU, the UK’s representation on the ESAs will change. If an EEA
model is adopted for UK/EU engagement, the UK will have observer but non-voting
status. If another model is adopted, the UK will no longer be a member of the ESAs.
Either way, the UK’s ability to shape ESA decision-making, including internation-
ally, will be minimal. While the implications can only be a matter of speculation, a
number of predictions can be made.
First, the UK will lose a channel for influencing international financial
governance. As a member of the major ISSBs, the UK will continue to advocate
directly for UK interests, as it did during the Basel Committee negotiations on the
pivotal crisis-era Basel III reforms. But it will lose the additional platform for
diffusing preferences which the ESAs provide on the ISSBs. It will also lose the
ability to shape how new international standards are implemented in the EU by
influencing the development by the ESAs of the related technical administrative
rules which can significantly shape business models and practices. This loss of
influence is likely to matter given that, assuming that the UK will seek some form of
single market access, regulatory equivalence requirements will apply. The UK will
also lose the ability to shape the ESAs’ still evolving approach to supervisory and
enforcement equivalence—these two elements of equivalence are notoriously
intractable and elusive.
Second, the withdrawal of the UK is likely to have implications for the ESAs
with respect to their international activities. The ESAs have been in operation for
over five years and the loss of the technical expertise which UK regulators provide
on their many working groups and committees is unlikely to be as disruptive as it
136 Notably in its 2015 best execution peer review (ESMA/2015/494), which adopted a significantly
more critical tone than earlier reviews.
137 See, e.g., IOSCO (2014), which followed an FSB request.
138 On Commission/agency tensions generally with respect to international engagement, see Chiti
(2009).
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might have been at the outset. Nonetheless, the ESAs will lose access to a deep pool
of technically expert regulators accustomed to dealing with the challenges of a large
and complex financial system and with access to a global network of regulatory
relationships. The ESAs may, however, find it easier to come to collective positions
on their Boards of Supervisors in the absence of the largest financial market in
Europe and its distinct preferences, and upon the removal of a strong and potentially
coalition-leading voice on the design of EU financial governance. In particular,
while the UK has long been a supporter of the ESAs’ role in developing the single
rule-book, it has been significantly more sceptical with respect to the ESAs’
supervisory powers and concerned to protect the Meroni constraint, as is clear from
the short selling litigation. In the absence of the friction provided by the UK, the
ESAs may prove more willing to test their powers, including by means of a more
assertive presence internationally.
More radical consequences may follow, but here predictions can only be highly
speculative. Fundamental changes to the institutional underpinnings of EU financial
governance typically follow a resetting shock, as was the case with the
establishment of the ESAs in 2011 (following the financial crisis) and of the
Single Supervisory Mechanism and Single Resolution Mechanism in 2014 and 2015
(following the euro area crisis). UK withdrawal may deliver the third such resetting
shock and lead to a recasting of the current unstable euro area/single market
arrangement and to governance arrangements which reflect euro area/Banking
Union preferences. Given that the euro area has already committed to risk sharing
through Banking Union and has supported the related institutional structures for the
mutualisation of supervisory risk, spill-over institutional governance consequences
may follow. These may include a reorganisation of the ESAs to reflect euro area
preferences. This is all the more likely given the current indications of some euro
area support for a Financial Union (encompassing Banking Union) with centralised
institutional governance.139 The ECB has already signalled its support for more
centralised capital markets supervision in a euro area Financial Union which would
‘complete’ Economic and Monetary Union.140 Any such institutional reorganisa-
tion, which would probably require Treaty change, would imply a resetting change
to how the EU engages with international financial governance, particularly if new
forms of ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ for the EU insurance and securities
markets were to emerge. Given the EU’s attachment to ‘off the shelf’ solutions
when it comes to institutional governance design, the most likely model would be a
twin peaks model built on current institutional structures. Given the availability of
the ECB/SSM, centralised prudential supervision arrangements could be located in
an ECB-based ‘mechanism’ and, given the availability of ESMA, conduct
supervision arrangements could be located in a (retooled) ESMA-based ‘mecha-
nism’. Were this to transpire, the nature of the EU’s engagement with international
financial governance would change radically and would likely be mediated through
two powerful EU supervisors.





What then might be concluded as to the recent ‘agencification’ of the EU’s
interaction with international financial governance? This article suggests that
international financial governance is becoming more operational and that admin-
istrative actors—notably financial regulators—are becoming more influential. In
tandem with this development, the ESAs are constructing a new administrative
channel through which the EU is engaging with international financial governance.
This channel presents the EU with significant opportunities for strengthening its
regulatory capacity internationally and also has implications for the effectiveness of
international financial governance more generally. The ESMA case study suggests
that the EU’s ability to impose its preferences internationally is likely to be
significantly enhanced. From the international governance perspective, ESMA is
likely to support wider international diffusion of standards, deeper sharing of
experiences and best practices concerning coordination and risk management, and
more stable regulatory relations. The persistence of a degree of constructive
ambiguity and tension in how the ESAs interact with international financial
governance, including with respect to relations with the national regulators on their
Boards of Supervisors, is likely to be productive. National interests and experiences
should, reflecting the persistent structural differences across the EU’s economies
and financial systems, continue to inform international engagement, alongside the
collective EU interest and experience. This is all the more the case as the extent to
which the ESAs’ current accountability structures, which are primarily based on
institutional reporting, can support their intensifying activities is not clear—full
coverage of this issue, which intersects with the global administrative law analysis,
is outside the scope of this discussion.
It remains to be seen how the current environment will change on Brexit. This
article predicts that Brexit and the withdrawal of the UK from the ESAs will result
in a diminution of UK influence internationally and may also generate existential
consequences for the current EU governance settlement, potentially leading to the
construction of new and powerful regulatory authorities through which international
financial relations will be conducted.
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